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VINDICATOR OF CIVIL RIGHTS
ROBERT L. CARTERt
How are we to judge a system of procedure? Fifty years ago, the
framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure measured those Rules
against a now-familiar criterion: they asked, what procedure will most
efficiently foster decisions on the merits?' Thus, Judge Clark called the
Rules "but means to an end, means to the enforcement of substantive
justice."2 Attorney General Homer Cummings told the House Judici-
ary Committee that "[tihe courts are established to administer justice,
and you cannot have justice if justice is constantly being thwarted and
turned aside or delayed by a labyrinth of technicality."3 William D.
Mitchell, Chairman of the Advisory Committee, told that same House
Committee that "these rules attempt . . . to get rid of technicalities and
simplify procedure and get to the merits."4
In short, it is fair to say that the Rules reflect an attempt to "de-
vise standards that efficiently tend the gates of the federal court system
without excluding claims for merely technical reasons."' The success of
the attempt may be judged by the Rules' effect of "permitt[ing] the
federal courts to open their doors to a new host of rights seekers,"' and
in particular those proceeding on novel grounds. The Rules themselves
t Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
I See Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 494, 497 & n.11, 501 & n.29 (1986). Other values that the reformers sought to
realize were economy and speed of disposition, see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 1, a unifica-
tion of procedure throughout the federal courts, and the spurring of procedural reform
in the states. See Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts: Hearings on S.J.
Res. 281 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 14-15 (1938) (statement of Arthur T. Vanderbilt).
2 Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New Federal Rules I, 15 TENN.
L. REV. 551, 551 (1939).
' Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts: Hearings on H.R. 8892
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938) [hereinafter
House Hearings]. "Courts exist to vindicate and enforce substantive rights. Procedure
is merely the machinery designed to secure an orderly presentation of legal controver-
sies." Cummings, Immediate Problems for the Bar, 20 A.B.A. J. 212, 212-13 (1934).
" House Hearings, supra note 3, at 24. "The books are full of meritorious cases
destroyed by technicalities. The whole trouble with our present practice rules is that
they are too technical, too much emphasis laid on form and practice, not the ultimate
end. What you are really after is the truth and the merits of the case." Id.
Note, Plausible Pleadings; Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100
HARV. L. REV. 630, 644 (1987).
' Resnik, supra note 1, at 500.
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are testimony enough to the framers' desire to accommodate decidedly
novel claims of right.' Even were they not, it would only be necessary
to reflect on the New Deal,$ legal-realist9 cast of some of the key actors
in the procedural reform movement to convince ourselves of their com-
mitment to adjudication on the merits of every claim, however unprece-
dented or hard to prove.
In the intervening years of practice under the Rules, procedure has
been called upon to meet numerous challenges that the reformers could
not have contemplated,"0 and it is perfectly meet that we reconsider
their drafting decisions today in light of those challenges. It seems to
me, however, that the first question, the threshold question, if you will,
is that familiar question of criteria: have our goals with respect to pro-
cedure diverged from those of the framers? And if so, what is it that we
now expect a successful system of procedure to accomplish?
One of the contemporary challenges facing the federal courts is
said to be the so-called "caseload explosion."" That very characteriza-
tion, of course, obscures important questions about the success and
functioning of the courts: which members of society are bringing
greater numbers of federal suits,'" why are they doing so,' n and what
' Compare, for example, Rules 8 (liberal pleading rules), 13 and 14 (joinder of
claims and parties), and 23 (class actions) of the Federal Rules with their far more
restrictive counterparts in Code practice.
8 "The federal rules ultimately were passed as New Deal legislation." Subrin,
The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J. 1648, 1651 (1981).
' See Note, supra note 5, at 645-47; see also Resnik, supra note 1, at 502 (dis-
cussing the drafters' ideological motivations).
"0 Professor Resnik has astutely observed that "one of the prototypical lawsuits for
which the 1938 Federal Rules were designed was the relatively simple diversity case
• .. between private individuals or businesses in which tortious injury or breach of
contract was claimed, private attorneys were hired to represent the parties, and mone-
tary damages were sought." Resnik, supra note 1, at 508; see also Hazard, The Effect
of the Class Action Device Upon the Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307, 308 (1973)
(discussing the class action as a necessary procedural response to the emergence of the
modern multi-transaction, "mass production" type of legal claims).
11 See generally R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 59-93 (1985) (describing the
federal courts system and arguing that "the system is on the verge of being radically
changed for the worse under pressure of the rapid and unremitting growth in
caseload"); Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 232
(1976) (commenting on the rising caseloads of federal courts and the threat such devel-
opments pose to the integrity of the law and the adjudicatory process).
12 Judge Posner, who traces the explosion of the district court caseload to 1960,
recently has noted that civil rights cases contributed less to that explosion than is gener-
ally believed:
[If the federal courts had not enlarged the rights of state and federal pris-
oners, if Congress and the courts had not enlarged the rights of people
claiming violations of their civil rights, and if Congress had adjusted the
minimum-amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity cases to keep
pace with the falling value of the dollar . . . district court filings in 1983
• ..[would still have grown to) more than two and a half times what they
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would be the social and political costs of denying them access to a fed-
eral forum for resolution of their disputes?' Leaving those questions to
one side, it is evident that the growth in the federal civil docket has
fueled demands that the Rules be revised or reinterpreted in such a
way as to encourage quick and economical dispositions. The criterion of
successful judicial functioning implicit in these demands-namely, effi-
ciency-may well deserve our attention, and I do not intend to dispute
its merits here. What concerns me, rather, is that otherwise legitimate
efficiency-based arguments are being pressed into the service of a politi-
cal agenda hostile to the substantive rights of certain classes of federal
litigants. This is a development that cannot be reconciled with the
founding purposes of the Rules, and it calls for some investigation
before we acquiesce in it.
Of course, the desire that disposition be expeditious and economi-
cal is by no means new. Roscoe Pound, in 1906, complained about ju-
dicial inefficiency. 5 The Rules themselves have always provided that
they are to be "construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action."' 6 This kind of efficiency coexists per-
fectly well with the value both Dean Pound and the framers placed on
"enforc[ing] ...substantive justice."
The new criterion against which procedural rules are being mea-
sured, on the other hand, is quite different from the earlier, substan-
tively neutral, desire for efficiency. The drafters of the Rules were pri-
marily concerned with preserving substantive justice from the onslaught
of an outcome-determinative procedural quagmire, and valued proce-
dural efficiency chiefly as a means to that end. The priority of these
values and their relationship as means and ends now appears to have
were in 1960.
R. POSNER, supra note 11, at 87 (1985). If the number of civil rights filings alone had
remained at 1960's level, civil filings would have been 3.6 times larger in 1986 than in
1960. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Table C-2 (1986).
11 A number of commentators believe that the very success of the federal courts'
functioning attracts litigants. See Resnik, supra note 1, at 495 n. 6.
1 See Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58
F.R.D. 299, 300 (1973) (arguing that greater accessibility to federal court provides "a
valuable escape valve, preventing explosive reactions during a period of boiling social
change").
11 See Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 406 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 287 (1964).
Judge Higginbotham has made the point that Dean Pound's "primar[y] concern[]" in
his 1906 address was with "assuring justice and improving its quality for all of our
citizens." Higginbotham, The Priority of Human Rights in Court Reform, 70 F.R.D.
134, 134 (1976).
18 FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
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been reversed. Much of the contemporary discussion on procedural effi-
ciency implies that a successful federal court system is one which most
effectively excludes certain kinds of substantive claims. Efficiency has
taken on a value of its own. My comments will be geared to demon-
strating that this is so, and to arguing that, while the contemporary
success of the Federal Rules may be assessed against a variety of valid
criteria, any criterion with a substantive bias ought not be among them.
We will be justified in speaking of a "substantive bias" in the con-
temporary application of procedural rules if we find that particular
classes of substantive claims consistently receive less favorable treatment
than others at the hands of those rules. A trend toward such a disparity
of treatment, in fact, can be discerned. Increasingly, particular classes
of substantive rights are taking on a disfavored status in our federal
courts. This development has not proceeded on the basis of any rea-
soned judicial or legislative judgment that claims to enforce those rights
are less deserving of disposition on their merits than are other substan-
tive claims,"1 and indeed has proceeded in many instances in the face of
a strongly declared congressional policy specifically favoring the sub-
stantive rights in question."8
The substantively disfavored claims of right to which I refer ap-
pear to fall under the rubric of what Professor Chayes has called "pub-
lic law litigation." Professor Chayes uses the term "public law litiga-
tion" to refer broadly to challenges to the action not only of legislative
bodies but, more significantly, of "state and federal administrative
agencies and large private institutions." 9 Chief among the rights en-
compassed under this heading are those arising under the civil rights
laws, and I will confine my discussion largely to civil rights claims.20
17 Not even the prophets of the "caseload explosion" are so bold as to suggest
directly that civil rights claims are less "deserving" of judicial attention than other
claims. See, e.g., Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation - Have Good Intentions Gone
Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 200 (1976) ("The essential role of the court in civil rights cases
speaks for itself. . . ."). The depreciation of such claims comes about instead through
indirection. See Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
HARV. L. REV. 4, 58-59 (1982) (arguing that the Court's tendency to erect procedural
obstacles to "public law ... adjudication" means that "the substantive choice is made
sub rosa, without explicit consideration of the policy issues" involved).
18 See infra notes 52 & 56 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative pur-
pose of § 1988).
19 Chayes, supra note 17, at 60. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1302 (1976) (analyzing litigation
involving the determination of public law issues and the application of regulatory policy
to specific situations).
"0 Other sources of public law litigation dating from the same period as the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 include the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Truth in Lending Act,
Consumer Products Safety Act, Occupational Safety and Health Act and Freedom of
Information Act. See Chayes, supra note 17, at 6 & nn.10-15.
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While it is beyond the scope of this Article to speculate as to the
deeper political causes of this trend toward the stigmatizing of certain
claims of right in the federal courts, I do hope to make a convincing
case not only of its existence, but also of a certain correlation between
the emergence of a substantive bias in our procedure and the develop-
ment of a school of thought that elevates ideals of efficiency over the
adjudicatory ideals that motivated the framers of the Rules. Case-filing
statistics are a crude first indicator of this trend. Those statistics show
that in the early days of the Federal Rules, the number of civil rights
filings as a proportion of all civil filings grew steadily. The earliest data
available put civil rights filings at a half of one-tenth of a percent in
fiscal years 1943, 1944 and 1945.21 That percentage grew to one-quar-
ter of a percent in 1950, one-third of a percent in 1955, and nearly
one-half of a percent by 1960 (0.47%). Civil rights filings grew stead-
ily, in both relative and absolute terms, with the enactment of new pro-
tective legislation; they jumped to nearly one and one-half percent of all
civil filings in 1965, then to over four percent in 1970; finally, they
peaked at eight and two-thirds percent in 1977.
Since 1977, however, a steady retreat has become evident, as fil-
ings fell to 6.8 percent in 1980 and to 64 percent by 1985.22 A myriad
of explanatory factors lie behind this decline, not all of which are re-
lated to a substantive bias in the courts. Nonetheless, the vindication of
civil rights is no less crucial to the well-being of the nation as a whole
than to plaintiffs individually, and it is significant that, during this time
of concern with the "caseload explosion," the federal courts have ac-
corded a diminishing priority to this important class of cases. This
crude statistical trend will take on much greater significance if we can
point to a specific procedural jurisprudence which directly impinges
upon the accessibility of a federal forum to civil rights claimants. Under
two rules of especial importance to civil rights claimants, Rules 11 (cer-
tification of pleadings) and 23 (class actions), such a jurisprudential
2 The statistics on federal caseloads contained in this paragraph and the next
have been compiled from various years of the ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Table C-2 (for fiscal
years 1943-44, Table 6). Until 1960, civil rights filings were reported under "private
cases," while thereafter they have been broken down into "U.S. cases" and "private
cases." For the sake of uniformity, the figures for "private cases" have been used across
the board.
22 Since 1980, the percentage has hovered between roughly six and one-half and
seven and one-half, and these variations may not hold statistical significance. In abso-
lute terms, moreover, civil rights filings increased by 1986 to nearly 18,000, as com-
pared to about 11,000 in 1977, the year of their peak share of the docket. Nonetheless,
in view of the importance of civil rights to our constitutional order, it is a matter of
some concern that cases seeking to vindicate such rights are apparently taking a reduced
priority on the federal docket for the first time since 1940.
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construction is, in fact, evident.
As originally enacted, Rules 11 and 23 were prime embodiments
of the drafters' abstract ideal of the role of procedure. The ideal that
procedural rules should advance the disposition of claims on their mer-
its lay behind both the simplified pleading requirements which implic-
itly informed original Rule 11 and the liberal provision for joinder of
parties which was taken to its furthest development in Rule 23. Both
Rules, to be sure, had regard for the legitimate concerns of efficiency.
The purpose of original Rule 11 was to bar the courthouse door to
groundless claims and claims "interposed for delay,""3 while Rule 23,
like its predecessor, Equity Rule 38,24 was intended in large part to
foster judicial economy by avoiding a multiplicity of suits.2 5 Impor-
tantly, however, efficiency did not obstruct the principal goal of the
Rules, which was the vindication of substantive rights. It is dishearten-
ing to be forced to conclude that this is no longer the case, but I believe
that as we now examine the subsequent history of these two Rules
more closely, that conclusion is inevitable.
I. RULE 23
Rule 23 was rewritten in 1966 largely for the reason that the cate-
gories of class actions maintainable under the original Rule 23 had
proven "obscure and uncertain" in practice. 6 The amendment of a
procedure under which it had turned out to be easy "to make a mistake
which will finally prejudice your rights"2 was fully in keeping with
the spirit that motivated the drafters in 1938. Only later did the sub-
stantive bias of which I have spoken make itself felt.
As a preliminary matter, the special dependence of civil rights
(and other public rights) litigation on the device of the class action must
be noted. The device of the class action is closely associated with the
23 The Rule originally read, in relevant part:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record in his individual name .... The signature of
an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading;
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading
is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it
may by stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though
the pleading had not been served. For a wilful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes to the 1983 amendments.
24 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note.
25 See J. STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS § 76 a (10th ed. 1982).
28 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note to the 1966 amendments.
2 Clark, supra note 2, at 551.
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figure of the "private attorney general."128 Congress has created, and
the courts have implied,29 private rights of action under a variety of
statutes which are thought to be so vital as to justify enhanced enforce-
ment, above and beyond that which the Executive branch is able or
willing to undertake. Fee-shifting statutes, including section 1988 of
Title 42 of the United States Code, have been enacted with the same
aim."0
Not only important statutory causes of action, but many significant
cases arising directly under the equal protection and due process clauses
have been brought as class actions. 1 In some of those cases, full relief
would have been impossible were it not for plaintiffs' ability to proceed
as a class.3 2 This was certainly true of the struggle against segregation
28 See generally Garth, Nagel & Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney
General, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 355 (1988) (discussing the ideology and role of the
private attorney general during the last 40 years); see also Chayes, supra note 17, at
27-28 (noting that "the class action device confirmed the self-image of public interest
lawyers as spokesmen for large groupings toward which they had duties and responsi-
bilities different from those of the ordinary lawyer-client relationship.").
29 The Court's jurisprudence on implying a private right of action in the face of
congressional silence is set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 77-85 (1975) (finding no
implied cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 610), and its progeny. See Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810-11 (1986) (discussing "the set-
tled framework for evaluating whether a federal cause of action lies"). The Court's
fourfold test implicitly recognizes that group rights, and not merely those of individu-
als, are frequently at stake in declaring the availability of a private right of action. See
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (first prong of test asks whether plaintiff is "'one of the class for
whose especial benefit the structure was enacted'" (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rig-
sby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916))).
"0 The legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), evinces an unambiguous preoccupation with
[tihe effective enforcement of Federal civil rights statutes[, which] depends
largely on the efforts of private citizens. Although some agencies of the
United States have civil rights responsibilities, their authority and re-
sources are limited. In many instances where these laws are violated, it is
necessary for the citizen to initiate court action to correct the illegality.
Unless the judicial remedy is full and complete, it will remain a meaning-
less right.
H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
1 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (three of the cases
consolidated before the Supreme Court were brought as federal class actions; the fourth
was brought in Delaware state court); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954)
(class action decided on same day and on same grounds as Brown).
32 Judge Weinstein has noted that "[t]he impact of class suits in civil rights cases
is substantial. Precedent alone never has the effect of a judgment naming a particular
class of which a person is a member. Very often, a class action permits the judge to get
to the heart of an institutional problem." Weinstein, supra note 14, at 304. The con-
trary argument, that class certification of civil rights cases is unnecessary to the protec-
tion of plaintiffs since the court may order "group relief in individual suits that demon-
strate group injuries," Wilton, The Class Action in Social Reform Litigation, 63
B.U.L. REv. 597, 615 (1983), is not compelling from the viewpoint of an experienced
civil rights litigator. Frequently, a court will decline to order class-wide relief, in the
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in public education. In the face of massive official resistance to local
implementation of the Court's decision in Brown, the civil rights attor-
ney could never count on school officials to construe a court order ad-
mitting enumerated individual plaintiffs to a segregated school as an
order to desegregate. In many other cases, particularly those seeking to
vindicate novel rights in the face of majoritarian hostility, the very abil-
ity to proceed required the institution of a class action. Again, the de-
segregation cases provide an object lesson. A lone plaintiff was ex-
tremely vulnerable to the pressure of intimidation by state and local
officials, and it was not above those officials to bring such pressure to
bear.33
The disproportionate reliance of civil rights claimants on class
suits is graphically illustrated by a sample consisting of all 109 cases
brought as class actions in the Northern District of California which
were closed between the years 1979 and 1984."4 More than half (56) of
those suits were classified as employment discrimination and other civil
rights cases, while another quarter (27) were other types of public law
litigation. The bulk of the remainder were securities and antitrust
claims. Only one of the class suits in the sample was a products-liabil-
ity case.
In view of the close identification of the class action with public
rights claimants generally, and civil rights claimants in particular, it is
clear that procedural obstacles to class litigation will have a dispropor-
tionately negative impact on those classes of rights-seekers. And, in fact,
a very striking statistical trend is discernible over the past fifteen years
in regard to the number of class-action complaints filed in the federal
courts. That number peaked ten years after the liberalization of Rule
23, when, in 1976, it stood at 2.7% of all civil filings. In absolute terms,
this amounted to fewer than 3,600 class suits nationwide. The propor-
tion of new civil actions brought as class actions dwindled to barely
three-tenths of one percent,3 5 or fewer than 750, by 1986, the most
conviction that it lacks the authority to do so when the class has not been certified. If
the decree is not framed in class terms, its stare decisis value may be only as great as
the defendant's good will and the limited enforcement resources of the members of the
uncertified class. Considerations such as these led the NAACP to bring its school-de-
segregation suits as class actions.
" For instance, in the protracted litigation aimed at gaining equal pay for black
school teachers, the NAACP frequently was unable to enlist plaintiffs unless local
teachers had agreed to guarantee the volunteer a year's pay.
" See Garth, Nagel & Plager, supra note 28, at 355-56 & nn. 5-6.
" In 1976, 3,584 cases were filed as class actions. That number fell more than
50%, to 1,568, by 1980, amounting to 0.9% of all civil filings that year. By 1986, only
736 cases were filed as class actions, less than 0.3% of civil filings. See ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, Table 33 (1982); Garth, Nagel & Plager, supra note 28, at 370 n.60.
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recent year for which statistics are available.
A variety of explanations have been advanced to account for this
decline. Among those explanations, political ones are certainly impor-
tant: for instance, the outgoing administration's curtailed enforcement
activity in such areas as civil rights, environmental protection, and anti-
trust,36 and restrictions on the bringing of class actions by attorneys
funded through the Legal Services Corporation (LSC).37 Yet the most
direct explanation, to my thinking, lies in the hostility which class liti-
gation has generated in some judicial and academic quarters.
The controversy over Rule 23 appears to have centered on its rela-
tionship to "the changing role of the federal district judge who must
shoulder the heavy burdens of class actions. The assertion is that cases
are now brought that are totally unmanageable and have a longer life
expectancy than many of the judges asked to adjudicate them ....
The most virulent attacks on Rule 23 have been reserved for the so-
called "small claim" class action under Rule 23(b)(3), which is said to
bestow benefits primarily upon class counsel in the form of hefty fee
awards.39 According to common lore, members of the class, on the other
hand, learn of the existence of the case only when a check for two or
three dollars arrives by mail. Finally, we are told that the courts have
found these "small claim" class actions "extremely resistant to expedi-
tious processing." 4
Whether or not the claims made in regard to subsection (b)(3)
suits are accurate, it is important to observe that class actions in public-
law litigation are of an entirely different breed. Public-law suits typi-
cally seek injunctive or declaratory relief rather than damages,4 and,
when successful, produce far more than merely gratuitous benefits for
class members. Nonetheless, complaints about the disproportionate bur-
36 See Garth, Nagel & Plager, supra note 28, at 385. The authors' empirical
research suggests that private class actions frequently ride piggyback on government
investigations and enforcement activities, see id. at 376-77, and they draw the conclu-
sion that "the private attorney general depends in substantial measure on activities of
the regulatory state." Id. at 384.
" See 45 C.F.R., § 1617 (1987) (requiring approval for any class action brought
by a staff attorney and providing guidelines for such approval). In the sample of class
actions brought in the Northern District of California, it was found that nearly one-
third (15 of 46) were brought by lawyers funded through LSC. See Garth, Nagel &
Plager, supra note 28, at 369. The drop in appropriations for legal services is thus
another factor in the decline in class action filings. See id. at 370.
38 A. MILLER, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS AcrIONs 3 (2d ed. 1977).
3 See, e.g., Kirkham, supra note 17, at 205-08 (discussing "the so-called con-
sumer class actions").
" Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and
the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 666 (1979) (footnote omitted).
41 See Wilton, supra note 32, at 600.
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dens that class actions impose upon the courts often blur the distinction
between the allegedly unsavory qualities of the "small claims" suit and
the altogether unrelated characteristics of other class litigation. Serious
students of Rule 23 are not led astray by this confusion, but an atmo-
sphere of hostility is subtly created.
If only efficiency were at stake in the class action controversy, one
would be surprised at the dearth of empirical data in support of the
claim that Rule 23 is not doing the job it was meant to do, namely,
providing economies of scale.42 The stakes evidently run much deeper.
At bottom, I believe, the attack upon the class action device serves the
same agenda that animates the contemporary challenge to the legiti-
macy of judicial review on the model of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.4" The critique of what is vaguely called "judicial activism,""" cur-
rently so popular in some circles, extends not only to the exegesis of
unenumerated rights in constitutional interpretation, but equally to the
remedial role that the federal courts have played since Brown when
faced with governmental and bureaucratic abuses in connection with
schools, prisons, mental institutions, police departments, trade unions,
and other institutions.45 The argument against the injunctive class ac-
tion,46 in sum, boils down to the substantive argument that the federal
courts should refrain from enforcing public rights in "class-wide" law-
suits, whether or not those lawsuits are class actions in form.
In an attempt to reduce the incidence of judicially-supervised in-
42 Professor Miller has noted that "[t]he available information ... indicates that
rule 23 is achieving some of its intended purposes and may well be providing sys-
temwide economies in several contexts, even though small-claim, large-class damage
cases have proven extremely resistant to expeditious processing." Miller, supra note 40,
at 666 (footnote omitted). More recently, another commentator has stated that, "by
reducing the probability of multiple suits, the class action is the most economic way to
resolve controversies in social reform litigation." Wilton, supra note 32, at 598.
43 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 In view of its willingness to reopen settled questions of constitutional law, it
must be questioned whether the Rehnquist Court is any less "activist" than its more
liberal predecessors.
45 See Glazer, Should Judges Administer Social Services?, 50 PUB. INTEREST 64,
64 (Winter 1978) (criticizing "judiciary's intervention into the administrative details of
institutions in order to implement the enjoyment of [constitutional] right[s]"); see also
Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legiti-
macy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 694 (1982) ("The only legitimate basis for a federal judge to
take over the political function in devising or choosing a remedy in an institutional suit
is the demonstrated unwillingness or incapacity of the political body."); Diver, The
Judge as Political Powerbroker, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 103-105 (1979) (discussing possi-
ble effects on judicial legitimacy when judicial intervention is deemed to be direct politi-
cal activism). On the link between right and remedy in public law litigation, see
Chayes, supra note 17, at 45-56.
"' Professor Fiss has coined the phrase "structural injunction" in this context. See
0. Fiss & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS ch. 9 (2d ed. 1984).
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junctive relief in federal public law litigation, the Reagan Administra-
tion focused on reducing the opportunity of parties in need of such rem-
edies to litigate in a federal forum. Despite the best efforts of the
Administration, the private attorney general has not been entirely
wiped out.4 Nonetheless, class action litigation and the consequent vin-
dication of class-wide rights have suffered greatly at the hands of a
hostility that veils itself in a cloak of neutral efficiency.
This hostility finds expression in the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in Evans v. Jeff D.,4' a case which cast a chill
over all civil rights litigation, but which falls particularly on class liti-
gants. In Jeff D., a Legal Aid attorney represented a class of handi-
capped minors seeking injunctive relief against Idaho state officials. Af-
ter two and a half years of litigation, the defendants agreed to provide
all the relief sought by the class, but on the condition that plaintiffs'
attorney waive his attorney's fee under section 1988. While his ethical
obligation to his clients compelled him to accept this offer, plaintiffs'
attorney expressly conditioned the fee-waiver provision upon approval
by the district court. The court approved the settlement under Rule
23(e), but denied plaintiffs' attorney's motion for attorney's fees.
At stake, quite clearly, is the vitality of the institution of the pri-
vate attorney general. Financial incentives, it may be, are not by them-
selves enough to encourage vigorous private enforcement activity. 49
They nevertheless play a key role both in an attorney's decision to un-
dertake the vindication of public rights and in his continuing ability to
do so. A majority of the Court, however, was of the view that "a gen-
eral proscription against negotiated waiver of attorney's fees in ex-
change for a settlement on the merits would itself impede vindication of
civil rights . . . by reducing the attractiveness of settlement."5 Only in
a footnote did the Court address Congress's foremost concern in enact-
ing section 1988:51 the provision of counsel to vindicate the civil rights
of those who "cannot afford legal counsel" and are therefore "unable to
47 See Greve, Why "Defunding the Left" Failed, 89 PUB. INTEREST, 91, 91-92
(Fall 1987).
48 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
41 If they were, one would expect the number of class actions since 1975 (when
the Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975), spurred Congress's enactment of a variety of fee-shifting statutes) to have
grown, not shrunk. Garth, Nagel and Plager, supra note 28, suggest that a truly vital
role for the private attorney general will not emerge until reformers recognize the close
nexus between private and public enforcement measures. See id. at 394.
50 Jeff D., 475 U.S. at 732.
11 See id. at 743 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 32 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)).
1989] 2189
2190 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
present their cases to the courts."' 52 The Court acknowledged the possi-
bility that permitting fee-waivers might cause "the pool of lawyers will-
ing to represent plaintiffs in [civil rights] cases [to] shrink," but found
an absence of "documentation to support such a concern," and ulti-
mately speculated that "the likelihood of this circumstance arising is
remote." 53
This is a curious denouement. If the majority is correct in its pre-
mise that "parties to a significant number of civil rights cases will re-
fuse to settle if liability for attorney's fees remains open," '54 then one
can only expect that awards of fees under section 1988 will become the
exception instead of the norm, resulting in a sharp decline in the avail-
ability of legal representation for civil rights claimants. The dissent
finds this proposition "[embarrassingly] obvious," and the majority's
disregard of it "puzzling. ' 55 In particular, it is obvious that the encour-
agement of settlement becomes a moot consideration as class actions
cease to be filed due to an absence of willing and financially able class
counsel.
As long as we assume the procedural neutrality of the contempo-
rary version of the efficiency argument, it is puzzling that the diffuse
judicial policy of encouraging negotiated settlements should have been
elevated above a clear and precise congressional policy favoring the pro-
vision of "effective access to the judicial process" to civil rights claim-
ants.5 The result in Jeff D. is not puzzling, however, if we take seri-
ously the existence of a substantive agenda which, cloaked in arguments
of efficiency, disfavors the vindication of civil rights in the federal
courts. In furtherance of a controversial theory of judicial competence,
the Court has taken a significant step toward eliminating from the fed-
eral docket a class of important public-law litigation. Jeff D. not only
guarantees that fewer suits will be brought to enforce the civil rights
laws, and in particular fewer class suits, but that in those increasingly
rare cases which are brought judicial involvement in remedial measures
will likely be limited to the approval of a settlement under Rule 23(e).
If the substantive bias evident in the application of Rule 23 arises
indirectly out of the fact that civil rights litigants rely upon class suits
disproportionately, Rule 11 has demonstrated such a bias even though
it is in all respects facially neutral.
82 H. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
53 Jeff D., 475 U.S. at 741, 742 n.34.
Id. at 736 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 760 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See H. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
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II. RULE 11 SANCTIONS
Rule 11, providing for sanctions against attorneys who fail to meet
certain minimum duties of inquiry, lay essentially dormant until its
amendment in 1983. (I say "essentially" rather than "entirely" because
I was myself among those who made use of the original Rule 11, as
will appear shortly.) Of those changes wrought by the 1983 amend-
ment, three stand out in importance. 57 First, the amendment clarifies
the standard against which an attorney's submissions are to be mea-
sured, by requiring the attorney to certify to his belief that those sub-
missions are "well grounded in fact" and "warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law." Second, the amendment further clarifies that standard by
requiring that belief to be founded upon "reasonable inquiry." Finally,
amended Rule 11 has taken on a mandatory cast, leaving the form of
the sanction, but not its imposition, to judicial discretion.
The amendment of Rule 11 was "part of an effort to reduce delays
and expenses in litigation, and to dam the flood of litigation that is
threatening to inundate the courts.""" Many question whether it has
succeeded in meeting the goal of reducing delay and expense. They ar-
gue that satellite Rule 11 proceedings may actually multiply the costs
of litigation.59 It is the second goal, however, that of "damming the
flood of litigation," that I propose to address here. I am by no means
averse to imposing sanctions to deter the assertion of legal theories or
factual premises which no reasonable lawyer could have thought plau-
sible,"0 or which are made in bad faith, and in fact I imposed sanctions
on such grounds on several occasions prior to 1983."1 The availability
17 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note; Amendments to Rules, App.
C, 97 F.R.D. 165, 190, 192 (1983) (letter from Walter R. Mansfield) (setting forth
reasons for amendment); Carter, The History and Purposes of Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM
L. REV. 4, 4-9 (1985) (providing a brief discussion of rules changes); see also
Schwarzer, Sanctions under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D.
181, 186-97 (1985) (discussing policies underlying the changes).
5' Carter, supra note 57, at 4.
69 See, e.g., Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 195 (1988)
(noting that "satellite litigation" allows litigants to challenge sufficiency of opponents'
papers irrespective of the actual merits); Weiss, A Practitioner's Commentary on the
Actual Use of Amended Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 23-24 & n.123 (1985)
(arguing that hostility between lawyers hinders settlement).
60 See Note, supra note 5, at 650 (proposing this standard).
1 See Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F.Supp. 630, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Carter, J.),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980), cited in FED. R. Civ. P.
11 advisory committee note, on remand, 94 F.R.D. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Carter, J.),
affd, 704 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1983); North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp.,
83 F.R.D. 293, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Carter, J.), cited in FED. R. Civ. P. 11
advisory committee note.
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of sanctions provides district judges with a useful tool by which to con-
trol our dockets. My objection is that, in application, amended Rule 11
has not been wielded neutrally, but rather has exhibited a substantive
bias against civil rights claimants.
A recent nationwide survey62 of reported Rule 11 decisions be-
tween August 1983 and December 1987 shows that motions for sanc-
tions are most commonly made, and most frequently granted, in civil
rights cases.6" Of 680 motions for sanctions which resulted in published
opinions, more than 28% were brought in civil rights and employment
discrimination cases.64 Plaintiffs were the target of 86% of such mo-
tions, and sanctions were granted against plaintiffs over 70% of the
time."3 (By comparison, on a sample-wide basis, Rule 11 violations
were found less than 58% of the time.)6 The next largest category,
securities fraud and RICO claims, accounted for not many more than
half as many sanction motions (15.2%). Such motions targeted plaintiffs
84% of the time, but resulted in sanctions against plaintiffs in only
45.5% of the cases.61
The reasons for this extraordinary substantive bias of Rule 11 ap-
pear to be two-fold. First, the revised Rule is so drafted as to invite
departures from the liberal pleading regime embodied in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Where Rule 8 requires a pleader to furnish
"a short and plain statement of [her] claim showing that [she] is enti-
tled to relief," but avoids the pitfalls of the Codes, under which a
pleader failed at her peril to specify her legal theory,68 Rule 11 pro-
vides a strong incentive to fix on, and articulate, a legal theory at the
pleading stage. Such a de facto pleading requirement, wholly at odds
with the general tenor of the Rules, must exact a toll in intimidation
from those who are seeking to vindicate novel rights by means of un-
tried strategies. I have no doubt that the Supreme Court's opportunity
to pronounce separate schools inherently unequal 9 would have been
delayed for a decade had my colleagues and I been required, upon pain
of potential sanctions, to plead our legal theory explicitly from the
62 See Vairo, supra note 59, at 234.
" See id. at 200-201; see also Note, supra note 5, at 631 & n. 7 (noting that
sanctions are more likely in public interest litigation than in other federal litigation).
" See Vairo, supra note 59, at 200-201.
65 See id.
66 See id. at 199.
67 See id. at 201.
68 Unlike the Codes, Rule 8 does not require a complaint to articulate, or adhere
to, a legal theory. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE § 1219 (1969 & Supp. 1987).




Similarly at odds with the underlying assumptions of the Federal
Rules is Rule 11's tendency to require the pleading of facts with speci-
ficity. As one commentator has noted,
[t]he current pleading standards allow pleading on informa-
tion and belief, and they permit complaints to stand if the
pleader could potentially prove a set of facts supporting a
claim for relief. Moreover, if a complaint indicates the trans-
action or occurrence upon which its claims are based, it need
not state all material facts. The liberal pleading regime also
offers liberal discovery for inchoate claims, Which frequently
opens up fruitful lines of inquiry into fact or legal theory by
providing access to material facts or information in-another
party's hands. Rule 11, by contrast, may be read to authorize
sanctions for factually undeveloped pleadings regardless of
the potential for finding additional factual support through
discovery.
71
The same commentator points out that a complaint may fail to plead
some material fact on the basis of a good faith legal argument that an
element of proof hitherto essential to a claim is no longer to be re-
quired.72 Rule 1l's reintroduction of the Codes' strict law/fact distinc-
tion into the pleading stage runs the risk of dissuading litigants from
bringing the kind of cases out of which important doctrinal changes are
born. Finally, Rule 1i's requirement of factual certification poses yet
another conflict with Rule 8, since a plaintiff who states a claim under
the latter rule must be given the opportunity to discover evidence in
support of his claim,73 while one who signs a complaint that is not
already "well grounded in fact" when it is filed is subject to sanctions
under the former rule.74
The second, and probably more pernicious, reason behind Rule
71 Indeed, the NAACP did not commit itself to an unequivocal legal theory in the
cases grouped together as Brown until those cases were reargued before the United
States Supreme Court. See Carter, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated
Education, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1083, 1089 (1988); see also R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUS-
TICE 302-05 (1975).
71 Note, supra note 5, at 636 (footnotes omitted).
72 See id. at 637 (offering by way of example the development of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur).
11 See Vairo, supra note 59, at 197 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48
(1957)).
' But see Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1279 (2d Cir. 1986) ("a plaintiff
does not have to be prepared to meet a summary judgment motion as soon as the com-
plaint is filed"), cert. denied sub nom. County of Suffolk v. Graseck, 480 U.S. 918
(1987).
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1 1's substantive bias is that it lends itself to decisions based upon
judges' subjective "feelings" about classes of cases and litigants. Studies
involving actual district judges have shown that we differ widely in our
judgment as to whether sanctions are warranted under identical cir-
cumstances. 73 To provide some indication of how subjective judgments
work against civil rights claimants, attention is called to a recent deci-
sion that ordered local counsel affiliated with the NAACP to pay some
$54,000 in sanctions to the federal government. 76 This penalty arose in
conjunction to a lengthy trial of charges that the Army engaged in dis-
criminatory civilian employment practices at Fort Bragg. Interestingly,
the court had earlier decided the bulk of a series of summary judgment
motions in favor of plaintiffs. 7 Nonetheless, the district judge held a
peculiar view of Title VII litigation. While recognizing that "evidence
of illicit intent may be extremely difficult to obtain, whether because
employers are conscious of their bias and therefore likely to hide it, or
because they are exercising unconscious bias through a discretionary
decision-making process," 78 the judge took the view that
[c]harges of racism, if proved, carry an enormously stigma-
tizing effect. Accordingly, such charges should only be lev-
eled after careful investigation, thoughtful deliberation, and
never without a reasonable basis in law and fact. This admo-
nition becomes increasingly true as the number and intensity
of the charges increase.
• . . [T]he court finds it must hold that to the extent that
any racism was proven in this case, such discrimination was
generally perpetrated by the plaintiffs upon the defendant,
not the reverse, for it was the plaintiffs who consistently saw
• See S. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 17-18, 37-39
(1985) (292 responding district court judges varied in their opinions whether to grant
Rule 11 sanctions in hypothetical cases); cf. Elliot, Managerial Judging and the
Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 316-17 (1986) (judges participating
in symposium workshop differed widely on assessment of merits of hypothetical case).
7" See Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (James C. Fox, J.).
Additional sanctions of $30,000 were levied against two of the plaintiffs.
"' See id. at 1228-30. The two cases consolidated for trial had originally involved
six named plaintiffs and forty-four intervenors. Eleven intervenors moved for voluntary
dismissal prior to trial, and thirteen more while the court was taking testimony. These
withdrawals apparently followed a series of unfavorable evidentiary rulings. Finally, by
agreement of the parties, all substantive claims but those of plaintiff Blue were dis-
missed, as were all of defendant's claims for sanctions save those of Blue and Beula
May Harris. In consideration for these dismissals, defendant agreed to pay a lump sum
of $75,000, less certain expenses. See id. 1229-37.
78 Id. at 1221.
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every criticism and action in a blindly racial context.79
On the basis of his novel view that the bringing of any but an airtight
employment discrimination suit constitutes a kind of reverse racism, the
judge warned these and future litigants not to assert their rights under
the Civil Rights Act unless they could point to a "smoking gun." While
the subjective feelings of a judge are largely responsible for such an
outcome, it is the language of the amended Rule which authorizes it.
III. CONCLUSION
Fifty years ago, the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure measured the success of their project against their vision of a sys-
tem of practice in which adjudication on the merits took priority over
all other goals. It is one measure of their success that the Rules they
drafted played an important role in allowing hitherto unaccustomed
claims of right to come before the federal courts. Under the new Rules,
too, the federal district courts rose to unequalled eminence in the pro-
mulgation of substantive doctrine. While much has changed since 1938,
it is hard to dispute the reformers' credo that courts function best when
they resolve substantive controversies on the basis of substantive law.
Today, a different credo has emerged. Its adherents, not satisfied
with courts that do "substantive justice," claim that the federal courts
are in crisis. But what kind of crisis? Is it a crisis of legitimacy? Not at
all; quite the contrary, it appears to be a crisis of popularity. I have
tried to suggest that the doomsday cries of the efficiency mongers mask
a hidden agenda, an agenda that seeks to limit the access to justice of
some rights-holders, but not others. In our system of representative de-
mocracy, it is the role of the courts to protect the rights of politically-
excluded minorities; yet precisely in these times, when the protection of
the courts is most needful, it is the disempowered who are sacrificed on
the altar of a substantively biased notion of efficiency.
As we reconsider the wisdom of the Rules in 1988, we must take
special care to heed only those arguments of efficiency that even-
handedly promote the disposition of claims on their merits. As the ex-
amples of Rules 11 and 23 prove, it is not always an easy matter to
discern a substantive bias in the language of a procedural rule. The
difficulty in doing so, however, does not absolve us of our obligation to
preserve the fairness and neutrality of our system of practice in the
federal district courts. It is time that we renew our adherence to the
79 Id. at 1221, 1227.
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tenet which guided the framers of the Rules in their quest for substan-
tive justice in the federal courts.
